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1. Introduction 
The European Union aims to limit its 2020 greenhouse gas emissions to 80% of its 
1990 emissions (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
2009a;European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009c) and to meet 
20% of its energy needs by renewables (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2009b). The European Commission has published an impact 
assessment (CEC 2008a;CEC 2008b), but not a cost-benefit analysis – an earlier cost-
benefit analysis (CEC 2005a;CEC 2005b) covered the eventual target but not the 
intermediate ones, let alone the details of policy implementation. This paper fills the 
gap, estimating the costs and the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 
20% in a decade.1 
Climate policy is one of the cornerstones of the European Union. It seeks to be a 
world leader in this area, an ambition which is broadly supported by the public (TNS 
Opinion and Social 2009). The “climate and energy package” for 2020 implements 
European climate policy in the medium-term. The Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
for carbon dioxide will be expanded in scope, the cap will be tightened, and permits 
will increasingly be auctioned. There are, for the first time, firm targets for 
greenhouse gas emissions outside the ETS. There are targets for the market share of 
renewable energy too. These policies will raise the price of energy, slow down 
economic growth, and reduce welfare. In return, emissions will fall, climate will 
change less, and the impacts of climate change will be reduced. It is reasonable to ask 
whether the benefits – i.e., the avoided damages of climate change – outweigh the 
costs. Maybe European climate policy is too ambitious, or maybe it is not ambitious 
enough. 
The results of cost-benefit analyses should always be interpreted with care, because 
estimates of the costs and the benefits of an intervention are never complete and rarely 
do justice to the complexity of the situation (Pearce 1976). These problems are 
                                                 
1 Note that total emissions in 2008 were very close to those in 1990. Note also that EU emissions were 
reasonably stable because emissions are increasingly outsources to other countries, particularly in Asia 
(Davis and Caldeira 2010;Helm et al. 2007;Peters 2008;Peters and Hertwich 2008a;Peters and 
Hertwich 2008b;Yunfeng and Laike 2010) 
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particularly pronounced for evaluations of such problems as climate change, which is 
global, diffuse, unequal, long-lived, and uncertain (van den Bergh 2004). 
Nevertheless, cost-benefit analysis is far superior as a guide to good policy than the 
hand-waving practised by some politicians. The results of this paper should therefore 
be treated with caution but not dismissed out of hand. 
The analysis in this paper is about climate change. The policy package also refers 
to the benefits of improved energy security, higher employment, and accelerated 
innovation. I do not attempt to quantify these benefits, or even argue about the likely 
sign. 
In Section 2, I survey the economic impacts of climate change. In Section 3, I 
study the impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction. In Section 4, I combine the 
two in a cost-benefit analysis of the EU 20/20/2020 package. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Benefits of climate policy 
(Tol 2009b) reviews the total economic impacts of climate change. There are positive 
and negative impacts of climate change. Positive impacts dominate in the short run 
(when climate change is largely beyond human control), but negative impacts 
dominate in the medium and long run. Impact estimates are uncertain, incomplete and 
controversial but the available evidence suggests that a century of climate change is 
most likely about as bad as losing one year of economic growth and probably less bad 
than losing a decade of growth. In the course of decade, the European Union can only 
have a small effect of climate change. Therefore, estimates of the marginal damage 
costs are more relevant than estimates of the total damage costs. 
The marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide, also known as the “social cost of 
carbon,” is defined as the net present value of the incremental damage due to a small 
increase in carbon dioxide emissions. For policy purposes, the marginal damage cost 
(if estimated along the optimal emission trajectory) would be equal to the Pigouvian 
tax that could be placed on carbon, thus internalizing the externality and restoring the 
market to the efficient solution. 
(Tol 2009b) reports 47 studies with 232 estimates of the social cost of carbon. 
Table 1 shows some characteristics of a meta-analysis of the published estimates of 
the social cost of carbon. One key issue in attempting to summarize this work is that 
just looking at the distribution of the medians or modes of these studies is inadequate, 
because it does not give a fair sense of the uncertainty surrounding these estimates – it 
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is particularly hard to discern the right tail of the distribution which may dominate the 
policy analysis (Tol 2003;Tol and Yohe 2007;Weitzman 2009). Because there are 
many estimates of the social cost of carbon, this can be done reasonably objectively. 
The idea here is to use one parameter from each published estimate (the mode) and 
the standard deviation of the entire sample—and then to build up an overall 
distribution of the estimates and their surrounding uncertainty on this basis using the 
methodology in (Tol 2008).2 The results are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 reaffirms that the uncertainty about the social costs of climate change is 
very large. The mean estimate in these studies is a marginal cost of carbon of €49 per 
metric tonne of carbon dioxide, but the modal estimate is only €14/tCO2 – close to the 
EU ETS price of €15/tCO2. Of course, this divergence suggests that the mean estimate 
is driven by some very large estimates—and indeed, the estimated social cost at the 
95th percentile is €185/t CO2 and the estimate at the 99th percentile is €439/t CO2. 
This large divergence is partly explained by the use of different pure rates of time 
preference in these studies. Table 1 divides up the studies into three subsamples which 
use the same pure rate of time preference. A higher rate of time preference means that 
the costs of climate change incurred in the future have a lower present value, and so 
for example, the mean social cost of carbon for the studies with a 3 percent rate of 
time preference is €5/ tCO2, while it is €76/ tCO2 for studies that choose a zero 
percent rate of time preference. 3 But these columns also show that even when the 
same discount rate is used, the variation in estimates is large. Table 1 shows that the 
estimates for the whole sample are dominated by the estimates based on lower 
discount rates. 
                                                 
2 I fitted a Fisher-Tippett distribution to each published estimate using the estimate as the mode and the 
sample standard deviation. The Fisher-Tippett distribution is the only two-parameter, fat-tailed 
distribution that is defined on the real line. A few published estimates are negative, and given the 
uncertainties about risk, fat-tailed distributions seem appropriate (Tol 2003;Weitzman 2009). The joint 
probability density function follows from addition, using weights that reflect the age and quality of the 
study as well as the importance that the authors attach to the estimate – some estimates are presented as 
central estimates, others as sensitivity analyses or upper and lower bounds. See 
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/Social-cost-of-carbon-meta-analy.6308.0.html 
3 Note that the estimates with a discount rate of zero percent are not much higher than the estimates 
with a discount rate of 1%. The main reason is that most estimates are (inappropriately) based on a 
finite time horizon. With an infinite time horizon, the social cost of carbon would still be finite, because 
fossil fuel reserve are finite and the economy would eventually equilibrate with the new climate, but 
the effect of the zero discount rate would be more substantial. For the record, there is even one estimate 
(Hohmeyer and Gaertner 1992) based on a zero consumption discount rate (Davidson 2006;Davidson 
2008) and thus a negative pure rate of time preference. 
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Although Table 1 reveals a large estimated uncertainty about the social cost of 
carbon, there is reason to believe that the actual uncertainty is larger still. First of all, 
the social cost of carbon derives from the total economic impact estimates – and I 
argue above that their uncertainty is underestimated too. Second, the estimates only 
contain those impacts that have been quantified and valued – and I argue below that 
some of the missing impacts have yet to be assessed because they are so difficult to 
handle and hence very uncertain. Third, although the number of researchers who 
published marginal damage cost estimates is larger than the number of researchers 
who published total impact estimates, it is still a reasonably small and close-knit 
community who may be subject to group-think, peer pressure and self-censoring. 
 
3. Impacts of emission reduction: A survey 
The IPCC4 periodically surveys the costs of emission abatement (Barker et al. 
2007;Hourcade et al. 1996;Hourcade et al. 2001); there are the EMF5 overview papers 
(Weyant 1993;Weyant 1998;Weyant 2004;Weyant et al. 2006;Weyant and Hill 1999), 
and there a few recent meta-analyses as well (Barker et al. 2002;Fischer and 
Morgenstern 2006;Kuik et al. 2009;Repetto and Austin 1997). There are two equally 
important messages from this literature. First, a well-designed, gradual policy can 
substantially reduce emissions at low cost to society. Second, ill-designed policies, or 
policies that seek to do too much too soon can be orders of magnitude more 
expensive. While the academic literature has focussed on the former, policy makers 
have opted for the latter. 
The costs of emission reduction increase, and the feasibility of meeting a particular 
target decreases if: 
• different countries, sectors, or emissions face different explicit or implicit 
carbon prices (Boehringer et al. 2006b;Boehringer et al. 2006a;Boehringer et 
al. 2008;Manne and Richels 2001;Reilly et al. 2006); 
• the carbon prices rises faster or more slowly than the consumption discount 
rate (Manne and Richels 1998;Manne and Richels 2004;Wigley et al. 1996); 
• climate policy is used to further other, non-climate policy goals (Burtraw et al. 
2003); and 
• climate policy adversely interacts with pre-existing policy distortions (Babiker 
et al. 2003;Parry and Williams III 1999). 
                                                 
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
5 Energy Modeling Forum; http://emf.stanford.edu/ 
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Unfortunately, each of these four conditions is likely to be violated in reality. For 
instance, only select countries have adopted emissions targets. Energy-intensity 
sectors that compete on the world market typically face the prospect of lower carbon 
prices than do other sectors. Climate policy often targets carbon dioxide but omits 
methane and nitrous oxide. Emission trading systems have a provision for banking 
permits for future use, but not for borrowing permits from future periods. Climate 
policy is used to enhance energy security and create jobs. Climate policy is 
superimposed on energy and transport regulation and taxation. 
The costs of emission reduction would also increases if emissions grow faster, if 
the price of fossil fuels is lower, or if the rate of technological progress in alternative 
fuels is slower than anticipated. This risk is two-sided. Emissions may grow more 
slowly, the price of fossil energy may be higher, and the alternative fuels may 
progress faster than expected.6 
There are only a handful of studies that estimate the economic impact of the EU 
emissions and energy targets for 2020 – roughly, the EU strives for a 20% reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions and a 20% share of renewables in total energy supply. 
The European Commission commissioned an impact assessment (Capros and Mantzos 
2000), and the Energy Modeling Forum organised an independent review (Bernard 
and Vielle 2009;Böhringer et al. 2009a;Böhringer et al. 2009b;Kretschmer et al. 
2009). To the best of my knowledge, no Member State ordered a separate impact 
assessment; and no academic (outside the EMF) studied the implications of the 
policies. 
(Capros and Mantzos 2000) report cost estimates for every single country of the 
European Union. They report results for a large number of scenarios; I here use two, 
one that is slightly more economically sophisticated than the actual policy and one 
that is slightly less sophisticated.  (Bernard and Vielle 2009;Kretschmer et al. 2009) 
and (Bernard and Vielle 2009) report estimates for a number of regions of the EU, 
while (Boeters and Koornneef 2010) and (Böhringer et al. 2009a) report for the EU as 
a single region. I assume homogeneity within the modelled regions, that is, every 
Member State within a region has the same impact as the region as a whole. Thus, 
there are six estimates for each country. 
                                                 
6 Note that the rate of technological progress is largely beyond the control of policy makers, at least 
between now and 2020. 
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Figure 1 shows the average of the five estimates for the welfare loss per country in 
2020. Table 2 has all the results. The EU as a whole would lose 1.3% of welfare, with 
a range of 0.4% to 4.5%. Spain and Italy would be hit hardest with a mean loss of 
1.7%. Belgium and the Netherlands would see positive impacts (when average across 
the five studies) of 0.1% and 0.2%.  Note that 4 out of 5 models estimate a negative 
effect for these countries. (Bernard and Vielle 2009) are the exception, predicting a 
substantial improvement in the competitive position of these countries. The 
Netherlands particularly benefits from a lower oil price (the feedstock for its export-
oriented chemical industry) and higher (absolute) margins on transport and re-export. 
For the EU as a whole, however, climate policy is costly. A loss of 1.3% is of course 
not dramatic, but it is projected to occur over the space of only eight years (2013-
2020), so that roughly one in every ten years of growth is lost. I’ll discuss below 
whether this investment is justified. 
(Böhringer et al. 2009b) show that the 1.3% loss is at least a factor two higher than 
it could be. This is because of the EU pays lip service only to cost-efficacy in the 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Particularly, instead of one price for carbon, 
there are at least 28 prices: one in the ETS, and at least one per Member State for non-
ETS emissions. Furthermore, climate policy is also used to serve other policy targets, 
particularly on renewables and energy security. Besides, climate policy is placed on 
top of pre-existing regulations. 
Figure 2 shows the price of carbon in 2020. Table 3 shows the detailed results. The 
price in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is some €32/tCO2, with a range 
from €7/tCO2 to €71/tCO2. The (unweighted) average price outside the ETS is much 
higher: €75/tCO2. The non-ETS carbon price exceeds €32/tCO2 in four countries: 
Belgium (€175/tCO2), UK (€126/tCO2), France (€120/tCO2) and the Netherlands 
(€116/tCO2). Although some Eastern and Southern European countries have been 
allocated more non-ETS emission rights than they will likely need, the non-ETS price 
of carbon is zero in one country (Poland) in one model (Bernard and Vielle 2009) 
only. This is because there is a restricted trade in non-ETS allowances. The non-ETS 
market price settles on €42/tCO2; this creates a scarcity in all countries and scenarios 
but one. 
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4. A benefit-cost analysis of EU climate policy for 2020 
4.1. Introduction 
To a first approximation, a benefit-cost analysis of greenhouse gas emission reduction 
policy requires that the marginal costs of emission reduction be equal to the marginal 
benefits of emission reduction. When evaluating climate policy for a single continent 
over an eight year period, the approximation is in fact fairly accurate. 
Note that EU emissions are a small and shrinking fraction of global emissions. 
Therefore, emission reduction in the EU only, and only between 2013-2020, 
necessarily has a minimal effect on climate change and its impacts. This argument is 
irrelevant, however, as it militates against any long-term investment programme. For 
example, by the same reasoning, it is pointless to teach children how to write the letter 
“a” as it is useless without the rest of the alphabet, or if no other children would learn 
how to read and write. Emission reduction by any jurisdiction in any legislative period 
necessarily has a small effect. That is no reason not to do it. It is a reason, though, to 
evaluate costs and benefits at the margin. 
 
4.2. Marginal costs and benefits 
Section 2 estimates the marginal damage costs of climate change. Section 3 estimates 
the marginal costs of emission reduction in the EU. The question whether EU policy 
passes the benefit-cost test is, at first sight, simply a matter of comparing the two 
estimates. However, there are complications. Firstly, EU policy is not cost-effective. 
The same target can be met at a much lower cost (Böhringer et al. 2009b). As cost-
effectiveness is a condition for efficiency, this alone means that EU policy fails the 
benefit-cost test. I therefore compare the marginal damage costs of climate change 
(Table 1) to the marginal abatement costs for the ideal policy (Table 3, bottom row) 
rather than for the actual policy. 
Secondly, both marginal costs and marginal benefits are rather uncertain. I 
therefore compute the probability that EU policy meets the benefit-cost test. I take the 
probability density function of the marginal damage costs of climate change from (Tol 
2009a). Table 1 displays some of the characteristics. Note that, for this study, I 
converted the estimates of the social cost of carbon to 2007 Euro per tonne of carbon 
dioxide. 
I derive the probability density function of the marginal abatement costs in the 
same manner as (Tol 2009a) derived the uncertainty about the social cost of carbon. 
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Each of the six estimates of the marginal abatement costs in Table 3 is assumed to be 
the central estimate of a Normal distribution.7 The standard deviation of each of the 
six estimates is assumed to be equal to the standard deviation between the six 
estimates. The joint probability density is the rescaled sum of the individual 
probability densities.8 See Figure 3. 
As the probability densities of the marginal abatement costs and the marginal 
damages costs are mutually independent, the bivariate probability density is the outer 
product of the two. The chance of meeting the benefit-cost test is then the integral 
over the bivariate probability density under the condition that the marginal abatement 
costs is less than or equal to the marginal damage cost. 
If all estimates of the marginal damage costs are used, there is a chance of 43% 
that the benefit-cost test is met (cf. Table 4). If only estimates with a zero percent pure 
rate of time preference are used, this chance increases to 60%. It falls to 26% for a one 
percent pure rate of time preference, and to 4.5% for a three percent pure rate of time 
preference. EU climate policy can be justified by great care for the future (i.e., a low 
discount rate) and by substantial aversion to risk (i.e., accepting a low probability of 
passing the benefit-cost test). 
 
4.3. Total costs and benefits 
Table 4 also shows the expected value of the benefits, which follows from the 
bivariate distribution of absolute abatement9 (Figure 3) and social cost of carbon. The 
expected benefit varies between 7 and 102 billion euro, depending on the pure rate of 
time preference assumed (if any). The expected cost is 209 billion euro, 1.3% of 
projected GDP in 2020,10 if emission abatement is implemented as planned. The 
benefit-cost ratio ranges between 0.03 and 0.49. If emission abatement is 
implemented in the cost-effective manner, expected costs fall to 116 billion euro, 
0.7% of GDP. The benefit-cost ratio increases to between 0.06 and 0.88. 
                                                 
7 Unlike the impacts of climate change, there is no reason to believe that the uncertainty about the costs 
of emission reduction is asymmetric or fat-tailed. 
8 Vote-counting as used here, while not entirely appropriate, leads to a wider spread than using Bayes’ 
rule. 
9 The distribution of absolute abatement is constructed as above: there are four best guesses, one each 
from the four models; the standard deviation of each best guess is assumed to be equal to the standard 
deviation between the best guesses; each individual estimate is assumed to be normally distributed; and 
the joint distribution is based on aggregating and rescaling the individual distributions. 
10 The models were all calibrated to the same scenario of economic and population growth. 
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At first sight, the benefit-cost ratios seem to be at odds with the estimated 
probabilities of meeting in the benefit-cost test, also displayed in Table 4. This 
illustrates the third problem with doing a benefit-cost analysis of a regional solution to 
a global problem. The results of the marginal/probability and total/expected cost 
analysis deviate from one another because the former implicitly assumes that the same 
carbon tax is applied outside the EU whereas the latter only considers the costs and 
benefits of emission reduction in Europe – that is, the benefits of emission reduction 
elsewhere are omitted. Equating the marginal costs of emission reduction to the 
marginal benefits would increase welfare – if the Pigou tax is applied to all emissions. 
However, only European emissions are regulated. Therefore, the benefits are only a 
fraction of the benefits of a global abatement policy – but the costs to Europe are the 
same.11 
 
4.4. The optimal level of abatement 
Cost-benefit analysis would recommend that level of emission abatement for which 
the expected marginal damage cost equals the expected marginal abatement cost.12 
The latter is difficult to ascertain as much of the variation between my six estimates of 
the marginal abatement costs is explained by differences in the no-additional-climate-
policy scenarios used by the models. Therefore, I do the cost-benefit analysis 
separately for each model. I assume that the abatement cost curve is quadratic in 
emission reduction from baseline. The marginal abatement cost curve is therefore 
linear, and the “optimal” abatement level follows from rescaling the abatement level 
used by each model. 
Table 5 shows the results. The EU target is to cut 2020 emissions to 20% below 
1990 emissions. This implies a cut of 19% to 30% below baseline emissions, 
depending on the model. If the pure rate of time preference is 3% per year, the target 
falls to 1.4-2.5% from the base year (1990), which is 1.6-2.7% from the baseline. For 
a 1% pure rate of time preference, the optimal target is 6.9 to 12% from base year (7.6 
to 13% from baseline). For a 0% pure rate of time preference, the optimal target 
exceeds the EU target: 22% to 38% from base year (24% to 42% from baseline). If all 
estimates of the social cost of carbon are considered regardless of the discount rate, 
                                                 
11 In fact, costs are higher because of leakage (Bernard and Vielle 2009). 
12 Assuming, as above, that all emissions are regulated. 
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two models suggest that the EU target is too stringent and two models suggest that it 
is too lenient. The optimal target is 14% to 24% from base year (15% to 27% from 
baseline). As above, the EU emission reduction targets can be justified only with a 
low discount rate. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, I survey the marginal impacts of climate change and the (marginal) 
impacts of greenhouse gas emission reduction, particularly in the European Union. I 
then bring the two strands together in a cost-benefit analysis of the EU targets for 
2020. The marginal costs of climate change are uncertain, with negative surprises 
more likely than positive surprises. Estimates also depend on ethical choices, such as 
the discount rate. A modest carbon tax can be easily justified. The current carbon 
price in the ETS is well within the range of available estimates. Emission reduction 
can be done cheaply, but this requires that emissions gradually deviate from the 
baseline scenario and that policy is well-designed and takes account of previous 
regulations. I find that planned EU policy does not meet these conditions. It is twice 
as expensive as needed, and would cost the equivalent of one in ten years of economic 
growth. 
Comparing the orders of magnitude of the costs of emission reduction and the 
impacts of climate change suggests that the EU emissions targets for 2020 are not 
likely to meet the benefit-cost test. Indeed, for a standard discount rate, the benefit-
cost ratio is rather poor (1/30). The EU targets become more attractive if policy 
implementation would be improved or if substantial weight would be placed on the 
remote future, but one would need a very low discount rate to justify the 20% 
emission reduction target for 2020. 
As EU climate policy for 2020 cannot stand on its climate merits, could the targets 
be justified in another manner? There are separate targets for renewable energy, which 
would promote “energy security”. Energy security is a fluid concept. Wind and solar 
power are less reliable than thermal power generation. Energy security may also be 
interpreted as diversification of supply. If so, promoting renewables is a second-best 
policy. Costs are unnecessarily high, and benefits have yet to be quantified (Roques et 
al. 2008). Energy security may also be interpreted as reducing the import of energy. 
Again, promoting renewables is a second-best policy, and costs are higher than need 
be. Benefits are unquantified – and may actually be negative as is usually the case 
11 
 
with import substitution (Bruton 1998). More informally, politicians regularly argue 
that climate policy would stimulate economic growth, innovation, and employment. 
Raising the costs of an essential input to the economy is unlikely to accelerate 
economic growth (Weyant 1993). Climate policy would redirect innovation rather 
than enhance it (Smulders and Gradus 1996). While appropriate tax reform may 
stimulate job creation (Patuelli et al. 2005) , actual policies are different. It is therefore 
unlikely that the EU greenhouse gas emission reduction targets would pass the cost-
benefit test even if the scope is widened. 
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Table 1. The mean and standard deviation of social cost of carbon (euro/tonne CO2) 
for a Fisher-Tippett distribution fitted to 232 published estimates, and to three subsets 
of these estimates based on the pure rate of time preference. 
 Fitted distribution (weighted) 
 All Pure rate of time preference 
  0% 1% 3% 
Mean 49 76 24 5
StDev 81 71 26 5
Mode 14 35 13 3
33%ile 10 35 10 2
Median 32 58 20 4
67%ile 59 93 32 7
90%ile 135 177 58 12
95%ile 185 206 72 15
99%ile 439 265 103 19
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Table 2. The impact of the EU 20/20/2020 package on welfare (%) in 2020. 
 Mean StDev PACE DART GEMINI-E3 WorldScan PRIMES PRIMES 
Austria -1.2 1.6 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 
Belgium 0.1 2.9 -0.8 -2.5 5.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.7 
Bulgaria -0.6 2.1 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 1.4 1.2 
Cyprus -1.2 2.1 -0.8 -5.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 
Czech Rep -0.8 1.8 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.5 
Denmark -1.2 1.9 -0.8 -5.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 
Estonia -0.8 1.8 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.5 
Finland -1.2 1.9 -0.8 -5.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
France -1.5 1.5 -0.8 -4.0 -2.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
Germany -1.5 1.9 -0.8 -5.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 
Greece -1.4 2.0 -0.8 -5.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 
Hungary -0.9 1.8 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.4 
Ireland -1.2 1.6 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 
Italy -1.7 1.9 -0.8 -5.5 -1.9 -0.4 -1.1 -0.7 
Latvia -1.1 1.6 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 
Lithuania -0.8 1.9 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.5 0.7 
Luxembourg -1.0 0.8 -0.8 -2.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -0.7 
Malta -1.2 2.2 -0.8 -5.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.0 
Netherlands 0.2 2.7 -0.8 -2.5 5.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 
Poland -1.4 1.8 -0.8 -4.4 -2.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 
Portugal -1.4 2.0 -0.8 -5.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
Romania -1.0 1.7 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 
Slovakia -1.1 1.6 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
Slovenia -1.3 1.5 -0.8 -4.4 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -0.8 
Spain -1.7 2.0 -0.8 -5.5 -2.1 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 
Sweden -1.4 1.9 -0.8 -5.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 
UK -1.4 1.5 -0.8 -3.7 -2.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
EU -1.3 1.6 -0.8 -4.5 -1.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 
         
First best -0.7 0.6 -0.5 -2.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 
Sources: PACE (Böhringer et al. 2009a), DART (Kretschmer et al. 2009), Gemini-E3 
(Bernard and Vielle 2009), WorldScan (Boeters and Koornneef 2010), PRIMES 
(Capros et al. 2008); PRIMES appears twice as it published estimates based on an 
overly optimistic and an overly pessimistic interpretation of the rules on CDM. 
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Table 3. The cost of carbon (€/tCO2) inside and outside the EU ETS in 2020. 
 Mean StDev PACE DART GEMINI-
E3
WorldScan PRIMES PRIMES
Austria 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Belgium 175 281 106 103 743 44 22 30
Bulgaria 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Cyprus 59 51 106 137 15 44 22 30
Czech 
Republic 
42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Denmark 79 94 106 259 15 44 22 30
Estonia 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Finland 79 94 106 259 15 44 22 30
France 120 128 106 158 357 44 22 30
Germany 72 48 106 83 145 44 22 30
Greece 59 51 106 137 15 44 22 30
Hungary 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Ireland 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Italy 63 48 106 137 35 44 22 30
Latvia 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Lithuania 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Luxembourg 53 41 106 103 15 44 22 30
Malta 59 51 106 137 15 44 22 30
Netherlands 116 139 106 103 389 44 22 30
Poland 39 36 106 33 0 44 22 30
Portugal 59 51 106 137 15 44 22 30
Romania 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Slovakia 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Slovenia 42 33 106 33 15 44 22 30
Spain 86 63 106 137 174 44 22 30
Sweden 79 94 106 259 15 44 22 30
United 
Kingdom 
126 143 106 151 400 44 22 30
     
EU 75 52 106 95 155 44 22 30
ETS 32 22 15 35 71 7 30 30
     
First best 44 22 37 68 72 17 30 39
Sources: PACE (Böhringer et al. 2009a), DART (Kretschmer et al. 2009), Gemini-E3 
(Bernard and Vielle 2009), WorldScan (Boeters and Koornneef 2010), PRIMES 
(Capros et al. 2008) ; PRIMES appears twice as it published estimates based on an 
overly optimistic and an overly pessimistic interpretation of the rules on CDM. 
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Table 4. Cost-benefit analysis of the EU 20/20/2020 package: Four alternative 
estimates of the social cost of carbon (cf. Table 2), the probability of the EU policy 
meeting the benefit-cost test, the expected value of the benefit, and the benefit-cost 
ratio for planned and cost-effective implementation of the EU policy. 
 All 0% 1% 3% 
Social cost of carbon (€/tCO2) 49 76 24 5
Probability of EU policy meeting the benefit-cost 
test 43.1% 60.0% 26.1% 4.5%
Expected benefit (bln €) 66.1 102.2 39.1 7.1
Benefit-cost ratio (policy as proposed @ 209.3 bln 
€) 
.32 .49 .15 .03
Benefit-cost ratio (cost-effective policy @ 115.8 bln 
€) 
.57 .88 .28 .06
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Table 5. Proposed (EU) and optimal (all, N%) emission reduction in 2020. 
 Mean StDev PRIMES PACE DART Gemini-E3
From base year (1990) 
EU 20.0% - 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
All 20.7% 4.9% 24.4% 24.6% 19.6% 14.2%
0% 32.1% 7.6% 37.8% 38.2% 30.4% 22.0%
1% 10.1% 2.4% 11.9% 12.1% 9.6% 6.9%
3% 2.1% 0.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.0% 1.4%
From base line (2020) 
EU 22.9% 4.9% 18.8% 20.3% 29.9% 22.7%
All 22.6% 5.4% 26.6% 26.9% 21.5% 15.5%
0% 35.1% 8.4% 41.3% 41.7% 33.3% 24.0%
1% 11.1% 2.6% 13.0% 13.2% 10.5% 7.6%
3% 2.3% 0.5% 2.7% 2.7% 2.2% 1.6%
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Figure 1. The 2020 welfare impact (percentage) of the EU 20/20/2020 package per 
Member State and for the EU as a whole; the bars show the average of six published 
estimates; the lines indicate the range of results. 
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Figure 2. The 2020 price of carbon (2005 euro per tonne of carbon dioxide) for the 
EU 20/20/2020 package per Member State (non-ETS), for the EU one average (non-
ETS) and for the Emissions Trading System (ETS); the bars show the average of six 
published estimates; the lines indicate the range of results. 
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Figure 3. The probability density functions of the marginal abatement costs and the 
absolute emission reduction in the EU in 2020.
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